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NOTES
INTERIM HEARINGS UNDER IMMUNITY ACT-
CONGRESSIONAL POWER VS. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Congressional investigating committees have in the recent past, when
confronted with a valid plea against self-incrimination,' been checked in
their endeavors to exact information A statutory provision to remedy
this impasse3 by granting a quantum of immunity from prosecution was
enacted by the Eighty-third Congress.' Because of this expedient's immi-
nent potency to foster encroachments upon individual rights and law en-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The privilege is validly claimed if the circumstances
evidence that an answer, or explanation would incriminate, or tend to incriminate the
witness. Emspak v. United States, 75 Sup. Ct. 687 (1955) ; Hoffman v. United States,
341 U.S. 479 (1950) ; United States v. Burr, (In re Willie) 25 Fed. Cas. 38, No. 1469e
(C. C. Va. 1807). The privilege is applicable to any proceeding wherein testimony is
forced. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1896). It does not cover past crimes
which cannot be prosecuted, nor disgrace, nor the possibility of prosecution in another
sovereignty. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). It protects only the claimant,
United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Immigration Comm'n. 273 U.S. 103 (1927), and there-
fore may not be invoked on behalf of a corporation, Essgee of China Co. v. United
States, 262 U.S. 151 (1922), nor as to records held in a representative capacity, Wilson
v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911), nor as to records required by law, Shapiro v.
United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948). See Note, 47 CoLum. L. REv. 838 (1947). Although
the privilege may be waived, Rodgers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951), Blau v.
United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950), every presumption will be exercised against this
waiver, Emspak v. United States, supra, and the privilege will be liberally construed,
Quinn v. United States, 75 Sup. Ct. 668 (1955). For a historical analysis see Morgan,
The Privilege Against Self Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1949) ; Pittman, The
Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in
America, 21 VA. L. REv. 763 (1935). For a discussion of current problems see GRIS-
WOLD, THE FIFrH AMENDMENT TODAY (1955); TAYLOR, THE GRAND INQUEST (1955);
Williams, Problems of the Fifth Amendment, 24 FORDHAM L. REV. 19 (1955).
2. Senate and House committee reports abound with instances. For a particularly
interesting example, see Hearings Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation
of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 2 at 115
(1953). During the year 1954, 266 witnesses before congressional committees invoked
the fifth amendment. 101 CONG. REc. 11316 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1955).
3. AN ACT TO PERMIT THE COMPELLING OF TESTIMONY UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS
AND GRANT IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION IN CONNECTION THEREWITH, 68 Stat. 745
(1954), 18 U.S.C.A. § 3486 (Supp. 1954). Representative Keating, House sponsor of
the Act, stated, "It is certainly in our national interest to give our investigating com-
mittees and our prosecutors a means of loosening the tongues of important witnesses
who resist all inquiries into their activities by taking refuge behind the fifth amend-
ment." 100 Cong. Rec. 13323 (1954).
4. The scope of immunity necessary to equate the constitutional privilege is com-
plete immunity against prosecution by the government compelling the witness to answer.
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896),
held that the fifth amendment does not protect against remote possibilities, such as state
prosecutions. Accord United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
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forcement, Congress delegated to the district courts responsibility for the
ultimate safeguard against abuse.6 The courts thereby are afforded an
opportunity to restrain unwarranted uses of legislative power that other-
wise would be insulated from judicial review.
The statute provides that, precedent to judicial determination, a plea
of the privilege against self-incrimination must be asserted in reply to a
question asked before a court, grand jury, or congressional committee.7
Upon confirmance of the expediency of the action, and notification of the
Attorney General, application by the United States Attorney or commit-
tee representative for an "order" or "approval" of the immunity grant is
made to the district court.'
5. The first immunity statute gave full protection "... for any fact or act touch-
ing which he [the witness] shall be required to testify ... " 11 STAT. 155 (1857). It
was felt at the time that the extent of the immunity would entice the most guilty to tes-
tify against their less culpable compatriots. Senator Pugh, CoNG. GLOBE, 34th Cong.,
3d Sess. 433 (1857). The Indian trust bond swindle that resulted was so flagrant that
it was asserted against the desirability of the present act. 100 CONG. REc. 13326 (1954).
The clause resulted in an amendment 12 STAT. 333 (1862) REV. STAT. § 859 (1875), 18
U.S.C. § 3486 (1952). This remained law until H.R. 6899 was approved Aug. 20, 1954.
In 1868, 15 STAT. 37 (1868) was passed providing the same type of immunity for judi-
cial proceedings. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), held the statute valid
as far as it went; but the privilege could still be claimed. Thereafter, Congress enacted
27 STAT. 443 (1893), 49 U.S.C. § 46 (1952) which supplied a broader immunity includ-
ing not only testimony and papers, but ". . . any transaction, matter or thing, concern-
ing which he may testify, or produce evidence, . . ." This was applicable only to the
Interstate Commerce Commission. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), held this
statute broad enough to supplant the privilege. This type of statute was later extensively
enacted for agency use. A listing of these subsequent Acts appears in 8"WIGMORE, EVI-
DENCE § 2281 n. 11 (3d ed. 1940).
6. The Senate bill, as originally introduced, contained no provision for approval of
the immunity grant by the Attorney General. S16, 83d Cong. 1st Sess. (1954). The
House substitute, H.R. 6899, was applicable to court and grand jury proceedings but left
the ultimate decision in the*Attorney General. See H.R. REP. No. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 1-3 (1954). This procedure was favored by the Attorney General. Brownell,
Immunity from Prosecution v. Privilege Against Self Incrimination, 28 TUL. L. REv. 1
(1953). The House Committee on the Judiciary narrowed the area of the statute's
operation to investigations concerning national defense and security, and the requirement
of the district court procedure was added. H.R. REP. No. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1954). See note 16 infra.
7. 68 STAT. 745 (1954), 18 U.S.C.A. § 3486 (a) (Supp. 1954). This provision was
inserted to clarify whether or not a plea of privilege was necessary to initiate the im-
munity. Under some previous immunity statutes it was held that mere testimony under
subpoena initiated the immunity. Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954); United
States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943). Under others a claim of privilege was a condi-
tion precedent to the grant. Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131 (1914). For analysis
see Dixon, The Fifth Amendment and Federal Immunity Statutes, 22 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 447, 554-81 (1954).
8. Witness can only be immunized
(a) ". . . when the record shows that-
(1) in the case of proceedings before one of the Houses of Congress, that a
majority of the members present of that House; or
(2) in the case of proceedings before a committee, that two-thirds of the mem-
bers of the full committee shall by affirmative vote have authorized such
witness to be granted immunity under this section . . . after having
209
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The first test of the act, In re Ullran,' originated in a grand jury
investigation of espionage. The case holding analogized the court's func-
tion under this enactment to the task of the court in conducting an ad-
ministrative subpoena hearing.1" The scope of judicial inquiry in an
administrative subpoena hearing11 could be applied with positive benefit
to congressional immunity applications. A court could through this pro-
cedure resolve questions vital to the preservation of individual rights in
a hearing withdrawn from the intense atmosphere of emergency sur-
rounding investigations in the area of defense and security. 2 The judicial
claimed his privilege against self-incrimination . . . and that an order of
the United States district court for the district wherein the inquiry is being
carried on has been entered into the record requiring said person to testify
or produce evidence. Such an order may be issued . . .upon application
by a duly authorized representative of Congress or of the committee con-
cerned ...
(b) Neither House nor any committee . . . shall grant immunity . . . without
first having notified the Attorney General of the United States of such action and there-
after having secured the approval of the United States district court ...
(c) Whenever in the judgment of a United States attorney the testimony of any
witness, or the production of books, papers, or other evidence . . . in any case or pro-
ceedings before any grand jury or court of the United States . . . is necessary to the
public interest, he, upon the approval of the Attorney General, shall make application to
the court . . . and upon order of the court such witness shall not be excused from testi-
fying or from producing books, papers, or other evidence ... " 18 U.S.C.A. § 3486
(Supp. 1954).
9. 128 F.Supp. 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd sub norn., United States v. Ullman, 221
F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. granted, 75 Sup. Ct. 882 (1955). For background of
United States v. Ullman, supra, see Dixon, Immunity and Separation of Powers, 23 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 627, 641-42 (1955).
10. In re Ullman, 128 F.Supp. 617 627 n. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The witness con-
tended that the court must perform a non-judicial, discretionary function and that there-
by the hearing was unconstitutional. This is a view that is shared by several writers.
Dixon, supra note 9, at 511-14; Comment, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 657, 671 (1955) ; Note, 55
COLuM. L. REV. 630, 657 (1955). The court held that under the court and grand jury
provisions of the Immunity Act no discretion was vested in the court, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3486
(c) (Supp. 1954), but recognized that the words "may order" and "approval of the
court" referring to congressional grants, Id. at § 3486 (a) (2), (b), may vest discretion in
the court. In re Ullman, supra at 624. Citing Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894), the court concluded that the hearing was a judicial func-
tion. In re Ullman, supra at 627 n. 22.
11. "The holding in the Brimson case that a proceeding for judicial enforcement of
a subpena is a 'case' or 'controversy' indicates that the judicial function in such a pro-
ceeding involves more than automatic issuance of an order. A court may always con-
sider such questions as unreasonable searches and seizures, self-incrimination, undue
breadth of the subpena, improper inclusion of irrelevant information, administrative
authority to make the particular investigation, power to make the particular investiga-
tion, power to require disclosures concerning activities outside the agency's regulatory
authority, the rule of the concept of business 'affected with a public interest,' and proper
issuance of the particular subpena.". DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW § 37, 123-24 (1951).
12. "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities
and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's
right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and
assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on
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considerations proposed by Judge Weinfeld in the Ullman case would
encompass the authorization of the investigation,13 the procedural valida-
tion of the request,1" and other legal objections.'5 The latter category
would seem to include claims of interference with constitutional rights of
witnesses.' 6
All these assertions occur in statutory contempt of Congress trials"
as well as administrative subpoena hearings."8 Both the hearing and the
trial are the result of a contention by an individual that the proposed in-
quiry is outside the field of authorized investigation 9 or that the consti-
tutional power of the interrogator to compel compliance is disputed;2"
but because of the traditional contempt power of Congress,2' not shared
the outcome of no elections." West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
13. In re Ullman, 128 F.Supp. 617, 625 (1955) (that the proceedings are within the
statutorily authorized area). This would seem to allow consideration of the committee
resolution.
14. In re Ullman, supra note 13. The court determines that the United States At-
torney has certified his belief that the grant of immunity would best serve the public
interest and that the Attorney General approves of this decision. If this procedure were
transferred to congressional grants, the court would determine that the record vote was
of the required majority to signify congressional certification of the public interest and
that the Attorney General concurred.
15. "No other legal objection exists." In re Ullman, supra note 14. When an
order is sought to force a witness to testify in exchange for immunity against prosecu-
tion authorized by statute, he is entitled to advance before the court any other ground,
legal or constitutional, for continued refusal to answer.
16. For objections which the court may always consider in an administrative sub-
poena hearing, see note 11 supra.
17. Quinn v. United States, 75 Sup. Ct. 668 (1955) (manner of claim of privilege).
Bart v. United States, 75 Sup. Ct 712 (1955) (necessity of ruling on the objection) ;
United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) (question in relation to the authorizing
resolution) ; United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950) (proof of the quorum) ; Sin-
clar v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929) (intentional refusal of information); Mc-
Grain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927) (power of Congress to compel appearance) ;
Aiuppa v. United States, 201 F.2d 287 (6th Cir. 1952) (power of Congress to investigate
area).
18. DAvis, op. cit. supra note 11,'at § 37.
19. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) (congressional investigation);
Jones v. S.E.C., 298 U.S. 1 (1936) (administrative investigation).
20. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927) (congressional power) ; Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894) (administrative power).
21. Congress has express contempt power to punish its members. U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 5, cl. 2. It is also judicially recognized that it has power to punish an impairment of
the integrity of Congress Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821) (bribery
attempt) ; but the imprisonment for the contempt could last only the length of the ses-
sion. Id. at 231. In seeking to overcome this short term punishment legislation was en-
acted as part of the immunity bill. 11 STAT. 155 (1857). See note 5 supra. It provided
that, after being summoned, a refusal to appear or to answer pertinent questions, or to
produce papers before an investigating committee, was a misdemeanor with a sanction
of a fine and imprisonment. This was sustained as constitutional by In re Chapman,
166 U.S. 661 (1897). It had been held however that as the powers of Congress are de-
pendent upon the Constitution the investigation must be within the power of Congress.
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880) (investigation held outside the power of
Congress). This decision was attacked on its historical analysis of the origins of the
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by administrative bodies,2 2 the dissentient committee witness must risk
imprisonment to obtain the adjudication available in a court hearing on
an administrative subpoena. Inasmuch as the immunity statute enables
Congress to compel testimony beyond limits previously recognized, the
individual fairly deserves the impartial interim hearing in the district
court to determine, without a congressional contempt citation as the out-
come of his judgment, the existence of a duty to testify.2"
The constitutionality of this hearing has been questioned." One
contention is that the court would be required to make a strictly political
decision, violative of the separation of powers, if the Attorney General,
upon notice of the intended grant, disagreed with the vote of the investi-
gating body as to whether a grant of immunity in a particular case would
serve the public interest.25 It is submitted that this constitutional question
could be averted. Faced with this disagreement the court conceivably
could maintain that, since the variance existed, the grant of immunity
was not a matter of verified public necessity and on that ground refuse
to issue the "order" or "approval" necessary to the immunization." This
practice would vest in the Attorney General the power to halt legislative
invasions of law enforcement,27 and allow the court to avoid the strictly
congressional contempt power. Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional
Power of Investigation, 40 HARV. L. REv. 153 (1926) ; Potts, Power of Legislative
Bodies to Punish for Contempt, 74 U. PA. L. REv. 691 (1926). The power of contempt
may be extended to investigations that have as their object fact gathering for a legisla-
tive purpose. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927). The legislative purpose
must be presumed when the general subject is one concerning which Congress can legis-
late, United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148, 157 (3d Cir. 1953) ; but where the ques-
tions and documents sought are not pertinent on their faces to the authorized investiga-
tion, the United States in a contempt proceeding must prove by other evidence the re-
lation of the questions, documents and the particular witness to the investigaion. Id. at
155. See Hitz, Criminal Prosecution for Contempt of Congress, 14 FED. B.J. 139 (1954).
22. An agency ". . . could not, under our system of government, and consistently
with due process of law, be invested with authority to compel obedience to its orders by
a judgment of fine or imprisonment." Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154
U.S. 447, 485 (1894) ; but judicial contempt power can be used to compel obedience in
a hearing that is a constitutional case or controversy, id. at 489.
23. Taylor, Judicial Review of Legislative Investigations, 29 NOTRE DAME LAW.
242, 279-82 (1954) ; Keating, Protection for Witnesses in Congressional In'Vestigations,
29 NOTRE DAME LAW. 212, 223-24 (1954).
24. Dixon, Immunity and the Separation of Powers, 23 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 501,
627 (1955) ; Comment, 53 MICH. L. REV. 858, 864-71 (1955) ; Comment, 22 U. CHI. L.
REV. 657 (1955) ; Note, 55 CoLuzu. L. REV. 632, 654-58 (1955).
25. Comment, 22 U. Cil. L. REV. 657, 670-71 (1955).
26. "It [H.R. 6899] requires, in the case of congressional investigations, virtual
agreement between all three branches of Government-legislative, executive, and judi-
cial-before an effective grant of immunity is conferred." Representative Keating, 100
CONG. REc. 13324 (1954).
27. This was the type of power sought by the Department of Justice, and incor-
porated in H.R. 6899 before change by the House Committee on the Judiciary. See
note 6 supra and accompanying text.
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political decision of which branch's estimation of the public necessity
should prevail."
Presented with consistent compliance by the Department of Justice
with congressional requests for the immunity grant, there is a real danger
that the hearing would become a perfunctory judicial acquiescence to the
extension of legislative inquiry power 9 unless the nature and scope of the
traditional burden of the courts under the separation of powers is recog-
nized and assumed."0 The tripartite system of government was instituted
as a method of preserving individual freedom by limiting governmental
power,3 and not merely as an expedient division of labor."
Under this structure the people have traditionally looked to the courts
for the enforcement of their individual rights." Early in our constitu-
tional history Hamilton realized that the courts, in their powers of review,
28. If the public necessity for the immunization of an individual is not perfectly
clear, then a refusal to entertain the hearing until the congressional body and the At-
torney General were in accord would be, in actuality, a judicial determination that in the
absence of a clear need for the information to satisfy the public necessity in this man-
ner, the right will not be invaded. See Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 249
(D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948) (public necessity was clear).
29. "[W]here there are competing demands of the interests of government and of
liberty under the Constitution, and where the performance of governmental functions is
brought into conflict with specific constitutional restrictions, there must, when that is
possible, be reasonable accommodation between them so as to preserve the essentials of
both . . . it is the function of the courts to determine whether such accommodation is
really possible." Minersville District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 603 (1940) (dissent by
Mr. Justice Stone). "The framers were not unaware that under the system which they
created most governmental curtailments of personal liberty would have the support of a
legislative judgment that the public interest would be better served by its curtailment
than by its constitutional protection." Id. at 604-5.
30. "In every case, therefore, where legislative abridgement of the rights is as-
serted, the courts should be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislation."
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). "And so, as cases arise, the delicate and
difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the sub-
stantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of
the rights." Ibid.
31. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (judicial review). "Judi-
cial review, itself a limitation on popular government, is a fundamental part of our con-
stitutional scheme. But to the legislature no less than to courts is committed the
guardianship of deeply-cherished liberties." Minersville District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S.
586, 600 (1939). See TAYLOR, op. cit. mipra note 1 at 30-57.
32. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (dissent).
33. Toth v. Quarles, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 4005 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1955) (right to trial by
civil authority); McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (freedom of
religion) ; DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (freedom of assembly) ; Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (freedom of the press) Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20 (1925) (searches and seizures) ; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)
(freedom of speech) ; Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896) (self-incrimination) ; Ex
Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) (habeas corpus); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 386 (1798) (ex post facto).
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protect the rights of the people from legislative encroachment. 4 Mr.
Chief Justice Warren recently reiterated this position by noting that the
power of Congress to investigate, while co-extensive with the power to
legislate, is not unlimited." Constitutionally forbidden areas of legisla-
tion, the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, and the necessity to
relate the investigation to a valid legislative purpose restrict the extent of
the legislative power." Moreover, this power is not to be confused with
that of law enforcement assigned to the executive and judiciary." As
these limits of congressional investigative power are successfully enforce-
able only through judicial power," justification for such an extension of
this investigative power as the immunity grant involves should be deter-
mined in the courts. A balance of interests may there be struck, by use
of judicial standards, between the individual right and the public demand
for information. 9
The climate of opinion which engendered the Immunity Act, a con-
cern for the protection of our democratic government through the use of
internal security measures,4" has as its correlate a tendency to minimize
the interests of individuals when they become an impediment to the grati-
fication of the many.4" This propensity, obfuscating the fact that indi-
vidual freedom is as much a tenet of our society as majority rule, is
manifest in the standards which are used to determine whether a par-
ticular investigation or proposed question is a justified use of congres-
34. "It is far more rational to suppose that the courts were designed to be an in-
termediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to
keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority." THE FEDERALIST No. 78
at 398 (Beloff ed. 1948) (Hamilton). "Indeed there is a sense in which it may be said
that the whole efficacy and reality of constitutional government resides in its courts."
WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (7th ed. 1907).
35. Quinn v. United States, 75 Sup. Ct. 668, 672 (1955).
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Another opportunity for the courts to enforce the limitations of congressional
inquiry power was provided in H.R. 780 sponsored by Representative Keating and passed
by the House, 101 CONG. REC. 2473 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1955). This bill incorporates the
court hearing procedure used by administrative agencies. Congressional committees
would, under this bill, be able to seek judicial enforcement of their subpoenas. This bill
will avert the necessity for the cumberous, contempt proceeding, complement the im-
munity statute and provide a "prompt day in court" for "any witness who really feels he
is being treated unfairly." Ibid. See WILSON, op. cit. szqpra at 142-172.
39. Representative Keating, 100 CONG. REc. 13323-24 (1954).
40. See GRISWOLD, op. cit. supra note 1, at 70-73.
41. Aiuppa v. United States, 201 F.2d 287 (6th Cir. 1952) ; United States v. Klein-
man, 107 F.Supp. 407 (D.C.D.C. 1952). Voorhis, Congressional Im'estigations: Inner
Workings, 18 U. Cm. L. REV. 455 (1951).
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sional power. 2
The area of individual freedom sought to be invaded dictates the
specific standard of justification to be applied. If the question merely
tends to embarrass, degrade, or harass the witness, a tenuous connection
with a legislative purpose is all that need be shown.4" If the interroga-
tion seeks to probe the political beliefs of the witness, some version of the
"clear and present danger" standard is applied to measure the propriety
of the intrusion.4" Congress may, through use of its inherent contempt
power, infringe upon rights of privacy protected by the fourth amend-
42. As most fundamental rights are considered conditional, Barsky v. United
States, 167 F.2d 241, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948), the courts
determine from an analysis of supporting authority whether the public necessity should
prevail. Id. at 247. In the absence of a showing of sufficient public necessity the fun-
damental freedoms are held inviolate. Rumely v. United States, 197 F.2d 166 (D.C.
Cir. 1952), aff'd on other grounds, 345 U.S. 41 (1953). The danger inherent in con-
firming congressional power to investigate an area, Barsky v. United States supra at
247, is that individual rights of all are decided in one case without distinction as to each
individual's relation to the problem. See Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49, 52 (D.C.
Cir. 1949). Moreover, it is extremely difficult at times to distinguish mere political
liberalism from communistic adherence. "I cannot deem it within the rightful authority
of Congress to probe into opinions that involve only an argumentative demonstration of
some coincidental parallelism of belief with some of the beliefs of those who direct the
policy of the Communist Party, though without any allegiance to it. To require oaths
as to matters that open up such possibilities invades the inner life of men whose com-
passionate thought or doctrinaire hopes may be as far removed from any dangerous kin-
ship with the Communist creed as were those of the founders of the present orthodox
political parties in this country." American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382, 442 (1950). These difficulties result from the confirmance or non-confirmance of
the congressional power rather than a determination of whether one person's individual
rights are or are not outweighed on the basis of necessity.
43. The question is a legitimate exercise of congressional power if it is shown to
be pertinent to the authorized investigation, United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41
(1953) ; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929) ; United States v. Orman, 207
F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Marshall v. United States, 176 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 933 (1950) ; Trumbo v. United States, 176 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ;
United States v. Keeney, 111 F.Supp. 233 (D.C.D.C. 1953) ; United States v. Di Carlo,
102 F.Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio, 1952); and it is shown that the 'investigation is in the
furtherance of a valid legislative purpose, McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927)
In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880);
Marcello v. United States, 196 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Lawson v. United States, 176
F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1948);
United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 838
(1948) ; Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 664
(1938) ; United States v. Kleinman, 107 F.Supp. 407 (D.C.D.C. 1952).
44. One standard was enunciated in Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 247
(D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948). "There is a vast difference between
the necessities for inquiry and the necessities for action. The latter may be only when
the danger is clear and present, but the former is when danger is reasonably represented
as potential." Ibid. It has been contended that such probing had no purpose other than
exposure of the political beliefs and affiliations of the witness. United States v. Joseph-
son, 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied 333 U.S. 838 (1948). The court discounted
this argument by observing that, "[T]he authorizing statute contains the declaration of
Congress that the information is for a legislative purpose and that fact is thus estab-
lished for us." Id. at 89.
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ment as long as the subpoena seeks information within the authorization
of the investigation. 5 However, administrative agencies, which must
rely on judicial contempt power, have been required to show probable
cause of law violation before a judicial subpoena is granted.46
The standard which must be met to invade absolute rights, such as
the privilege against self-incrimination, is a complete substitution for in-
tended benefits." Immunization from federal prosecution resulting from
the incriminating evidence given was narrowly held to be an adequate
substitute for the effect of this privilege. 8 Apart from self-incrimina-
tion, the interlacing of the specific and general rights of the people under
the Constitution collectively establish a right of individual integrity.49
45. REv. STAT. § 102, as amended, 2 U.S.C.A. § 192 (Supp. 1954) ; United States v.
Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Jurney v.
McCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935) ; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), Fleischman v.
United States, 174 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir 1949), rea'd. on other grounds, 339 U.S. 349
(1950) ; Fields v. United States, 164 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1947) ; United States v. Flaxer,
113 F.Supp. 669 (D.C.D.C. 1953) ; United States v. Kamp, 102 F.Supp. 757 (D.C.D.C.
1952) ; United States v. Cohen, 101 F.Supp. 906 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
46. Jones v. S.E.C., 298 U.S. 1 (1935); F.T.C. v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S.
298 (1924) ; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) ; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886) ; Bowles v. Insel, 148 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1945). But see Oklahoma Press Publish-
ing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
47. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). See note 1 supra.
48. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896) (5-4 decision). Two English cases
were cited as precedent for the holding that state prosecution was a remote possibility.
King of Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 7 State & N.S. 1049 (Eng. 1851) (prosecution by
foreign sovereignty) ; Reg. v. Boyes, 121 Engl. Rep. 730 (1861) (possibility of parlia-
mentary impeachment after pardon by the Crown). There is a real question as to
whether the hazard of prosecution by a state is remote inasmuch as testimony com-
pelled by the Immunity Act is eminently relevant in state sedition prosecutions. See
Commonwealth v. Nelson, 377 Pa. 58, 104 A.2d 133 (1954), cert. granted, 75 Sup. Ct.
58 (1955). There is evidence of a desire "to close that loophole." Senator McCarran,
99 CONG. REc. 8341 (1953) (discussing S. 16) but there is some doubt as to whether it
has been accomplished. See H.R. REP. No. 2606 83d Cong. 2d Sess. (1954), Representa-
tive Celler, 100 CONG. REc. 13326 (1954) (discussing H.R. 6899). This point has been
put in issue again. "Defendant [Ullman] asks us to modify this doctrine [Brown v.
Walker] in the light of new circumstances which have since arisen. [T]he argument
must be addressed not to our ears but to eighteen others in Washington, D. C." United
States v. Ullman, 221 F.2d 760, 761-62 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 75 Sup. Ct. 882 (1955).
49. Whether the fourth amendment is limited to "material things," Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928), or extends to feelings, emotions, sensations, and
beliefs becoming "the right to be let alone," id. at 478 (dissent), it must be admitted
that these latter rights are existent in our society. It has been unsuccessfully argued
that these vital rights lie in the first amendment. See note 44 supra. But the question
of whether these individual rights are sufficiently inviolable as to preclude certain types
of congressional questioning has never been answered by the Supreme Court. For the
latest avoidance, see Quinn v. United States, 75 Sup. Ct. 668 (1955). The argument has
been broached in a concurring'opinion. "Since Congress could not by law require of
respondent what the House demanded, it may not take the first step in an inquiry ending
in fine or imprisonment." United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 58 (1952). See
Nutting, Freedom of Silence 47 MicH. L. REv. 181, 213-22 (1948) ; Note, 21 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 602 (1953). For general background see the UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW
SCHOOL CONFERENCE SERIES No. 13, CONFERENCE ON FREEDOM AND THE LAW (1953).
These rights may be in the future attached to the ninth amendment. BARTH, GOVERN-
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This right, though invaded by a compulsion to testify, is not protected by
a grant of immunity. Immunization is incapable of protecting a witness
from disgrace and socio-economic sanctions from which, to a variant
degree,5" he would be spared by the silence normally following the claim
of the absolute privilege.5
If Congress determines that public necessity demands information
of so specific a nature that it may be gained only by abrogating the abso-
lute privilege against self-incrimination, it should be shown in the hearing
that it is probable that the desired information is held by the pleading
witness. This would create a relationship between the individual and the
legislative problem which would serve as a foundation for the extension
of coercive power to compel testimony.52 If the committee could not
establish this probability through its existent investigatory power, it would
be unreasonable to extend the power in the mere hope that the need will
be met.
As long as Congress employed only its traditional contempt power to
compel testimony, the court was precluded by recognition of the legisla-
tive purpose from questioning the general duty of the witness to testify."3
This situation no longer obtains. The statutory necessity for the court
"order" or "approval" whether it involves employing judicial contempt
MENT BY INVESTIGATION, 11 (1955) ; PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT,(1955).
50. It is recognized that many doors are closed to the witness merely by pleading
the privilege against self-incrimination. Byse, Teachers and the Fifth Amendment, 102
U. PA. L. REV. 871 (1954) ; Finklehor, Stockdale, The Professor and the Fifth Amend-
ient, 16 U. PITT. L. REv. 344 (1955) ; Brown, Fasset, Security Tests for Wartime
Workers: Due Process Under the Port-Security Program, 62 YALE L.J. 1163 (1953) ;
Countryman, Loyalty Tests for Lawyers, 13 LAw. GUILD REV. 149 (1953); Note, 35
B.U.L. REV. 185 (1955); Note, 38 MAg. L. REv. 8 (1954) ; 4 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 51
(1954). Compare TAYLOR Op. cit. supra note 1, at 210; Williams, Problems of the Fifth,
Amendment, 24 FORDHAm L. REV. 19, 42 (1955).
51. It would be a hollow grant of immunity if the witness coerced to testify were
subjected to existing federal and state sanctions. See FUND FOR THE REPUBmLIC, THE DI-
GEST OF THE RUBLIC REcoRD OF COMMUNISM" IN THE UNITED STATES (1955). This is
one of the issues before the court in United States v. Ullman, 221 F.2d 760 (2d Cir.),
cert. granted, 75 Sup. Ct. 882 (1955). See the concurring opinion by Circuit Court Judge
Clark. Id. at 763.
52. Persons have a right to be exempt from all unauthorized, arbitrary, or un-
reasonable inquiries into their personal and private affairs. Sinclair v. United States,
279 U.S. 263, 292 (1929). Moreover, while it may be that Congress may have commit-
tee hearings to inform the public, it has never been held that the committee may use con-
tempt power without a legislative purpose. United States v. Kleinman, 107 F. Supp.
407 (D.C.D.C. 1952). See TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note 1, at 209; King, Immunity for
Witnesses, 40 A.B.A.J. 377 (1954) ; Nutting, Freedom of Silence, 47 MIcH. L. REv. 181,
218-22 (1949). There is cause for concern that this Immunity Act would be used merely
to expose. In debate over S. 16 Senator Ferguson stated, ". . . it [immunization] would
be the greatest legal, constitutional weapon we could have for exposure and prosecution
of subversive activities such as communism." 99 CONG. REc. 8341 (1953).
53. See note 43 supra.
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power or operates merely as a procedural check upon the further use of
congressional contempt power, 4 lends itself to judicial perusal of the in-
dividual duty to further testify. If the witness, the legislature, and the
Attorney General desire the grant of immunity, the court still must con-
sider the proof of probability before an order will be issued. 5 The timely
court hearing would lend form and order through a stabilizing procedure
allowing individual rights to be synchronized with the demands of repre-
sentative government.
The hearing on the immunity grant is a feasible practice in which the
constitutional basis for government can be made operative. In the hearing
the individual's duty to testify may be established upon an individual,
ad hoc basis. A corresponding power of Congress to coerce incriminatory
answers can be extended for one witness and returned to its normal
scope. This utilization of the hearing recognizes that the legislative and
executive branches have decisions to make that are based on the political
expediency and immediacy of the need, and that the judiciary assumes
the burden of timely enforcement of rights under a living Constitution."
The interaction of interests in an impartial judicial hearing affords assur-
ance that the most information will be gained with the least sacrifice of
individual rights.
THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS
Aliens, facing deportation, although ostensibly guaranteed due
process of law by the courts,' have in the past received strikingly little
54. It would be difficult to convincingly demonstrate that under the Immunity Act,
note 3 supra, in contrast to H.R. 780, the court was not to use judicial contempt power to
enforce orders issuing from both proceedings. It is believed significant that Represen-
tative Keating sponsored both the Act and the Bill. See Keating, supra note 23 at 223-
224.
55. In this manner the court may be best assured that "the immunity power is not
frittered away," It re Ullman, 128 F.Supp. 617, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), and that the "pub-
lic necessities" do outweigh the private interests. Barsky v. United States 167 F.2d 241,
249 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
56. See note 34 supra, and accompanying text.
1. United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103
(1927) ; United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923) ; Japanese Immi-
grant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903). "[T]his court has never held, nor must we now be
understood as holding, that administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a
statute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that
inhere in 'due process of law'. . . ." Id. at 100. Sometimes the courts while speaking
in terms of due process have actually done little more than rubber-stamp the action of
the agency enforcing the deportation laws. "It is true that she [petitioner] pleads a
want of knowledge of our language; that she did not understand the nature and import
of the questions propounded to her; that the investigation made was a 'pretended' one;
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